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Constitutional Law:
Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers1
Zachary S. Price
Congress’s “power of the purse”—its authority to deny access to
public funds—is one of its most essential constitutional authorities. In
our era of political polarization, that power has also emerged as a
recurrent source of bare-knuckle inter-branch conflict. In recent years,
the federal government has “shut down” repeatedly as political
disagreements between Congress and the executive branch prevented
enactment of new appropriations to keep federal agencies running past
the expiration of prior appropriations. Congress also has sought to
thwart key presidential objectives—such as President Obama’s
campaign pledge to close the Guantanamo Bay prison and President
Trump’s pledge to build a border wall—through funding restrictions,
and presidents have at times claimed statutory or constitutional
authority to circumvent such restrictions.
These conflicts raise an important and under-theorized separationof-powers question: To what degree, if at all, may Congress employ its
power over appropriations to prevent or control how presidents exercise
their constitutional executive authorities?
Could Congress, for
example, condition appropriations on the President’s issuance of a
particular pardon? Could Congress prevent or require investigation and
prosecution of particular federal offenses through appropriations
restrictions, notwithstanding the president’s responsibility to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed”? Or could it prevent or require a
particular use of military force even though the Constitution makes the
president “Commander in Chief” of the armed forces?
Presidents, legislators, and courts have articulated divergent
positions on these questions. President Trump, for example, asserted
authority in a signing statement to disregard a provision barring use of
Justice Department appropriations to prosecute state-authorized
medical-marijuana businesses, yet Congress asserted the opposite view
by repeatedly enacting the provision in question.
This chapter offers a summarized analysis of this question.
Concretely, it argues that the answers to the questions above on the
pardon power, law enforcement, and military force are no, yes, and yes,
1. Summarized and excerpted from Zachary S. Price, Funding
Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357 (2018).
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respectively. It also defends Congress’s authority to restrict prisoner
transfers out of Guantanamo Bay and limit marijuana enforcement. The
key to analyzing all these questions, the chapter argues, is to distinguish
between executive powers that are “resource-independent” and those
that are instead “resource-dependent.” Resource-independent powers,
which include the pardon power as well as the veto, appointment
authority, and supervisory control over the military, may at least
theoretically be exercised by the president personally and therefore may
not be controlled through restricted or conditional appropriations.
Resource-dependent powers, by contrast, which include law
enforcement and affirmative use of military force, depend on
congressional appropriations for their exercise and may therefore be
controlled by limits Congress enacts in appropriations statutes.
Framing the Problem
Congress’s “power of the purse,” once described by the great
scholar Edward Corwin as “the most important single curb” on
presidential authority,2 is the basic constitutional principle that the
people’s representatives in Congress control both public revenue and
public expenditure. The Constitution expressly grants Congress the
authority to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and
“to borrow Money on the credit of the United States.” It also grants
Congress power “to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States,” to “raise and
support Armies,” and to “provide and maintain a Navy,” although no
army appropriation may exceed two years in duration and Congress
must provide for a regular accounting of public expenditures. The
Constitution makes these congressional powers exclusive.
The
Appropriations Clause provides: “No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”
Money thus may flow neither in to nor out from the public purse
without advance congressional approval by statute.
Historically, this power over appropriations played a key role in
Anglo-American constitutional development. Through control over
appropriations, the British Parliament extracted constitutional
concessions from the crown. Colonial legislatures followed suit with
respect to royal governors; indeed, royal efforts to cut governors loose
from local purse strings provided one impetus for the American

2. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
134 (13th ed. 1975).
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Revolution. Given this background, the Framers naturally recognized
legislative control over government finance as a key check on the other
branches. In the Federalist No. 58, James Madison described
Congress’s power of the purse as “the most complete and effectual
weapon with which any constitution can arm the representatives of the
people.” He also called it “that powerful instrument by which we
behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble
representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its
activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have
wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the
government.”
This congressional authority is no less important today. Through
accumulated statutory delegations and accreted executive practice, the
executive branch today often holds significant power to take action or
set policy in the first instance, in areas ranging from regulatory policy
to law enforcement to foreign affairs. Against this background,
congressional authority over appropriations remains an important backend constraint on the Executive. If it disapproves of executive actions
or policy, it might override or limit the president’s choices by denying
government funds in the next annual appropriation.
Understanding Congress’s appropriations power as a structural
check on the executive, however, masks an important conceptual
puzzle. Our Constitution, unlike Britain’s, generally does not allow
leveraged adjustment of relative interbranch authorities through
ordinary legislation; it instead fixes in place certain authorities for each
branch. From that point of view, using appropriations power to
constrain executive authorities could violate the Constitution, but by
the same token an unfettered presidential authority to disregard
appropriations restraints could eliminate an important legislative check
on executive policy. This problem emerged early in the country’s
history in debates over appropriations for treaty obligations, yet it has
received insufficient sustained scholarly consideration.
Resource-Independent Powers
Distinguishing between executive authorities that are “resourceindependent” and those that are “resource-dependent” can yield a
coherent and normatively satisfying framework that accords not only
with the constitutional text and structure but also with the broad
contours of historical practice. Resource-independent powers are those
that are at least theoretically costless: Presidents in principle may
exercise them personally, keeping their own counsel and using only

42

Scholarship for the Bench

[Vol. 3

their own salary or other personal resources. The key examples here
are the powers to veto legislation, grant clemency, appoint and remove
officers, issue lawful commands to the military, demand written
opinions from department heads, and recommend legislation.
The key characteristic of these powers, again, is their notional
costlessness. In a celebrated essay from 1976, Charles Black asked
himself, “To what state could Congress, without violating the
Constitution, reduce the President?” His answer: “I arrived at a picture
of a man living in a modest apartment, with perhaps one secretary to
answer the mail; that is where one appropriation bill could put him, at
the beginning of a new term. . . . But he was still vetoing bills.”3
Black’s observations capture the veto’s fundamental independence
from public resources provided for its support. But other executive
powers have the same qualities. Even the enfeebled president that
Black imagined could also issue pardons, send nominees to the Senate,
fire executive officers who displeased him, issue lawful military
commands, and try his or her hand at drafting legislation, among other
things.
Insofar as they are not dependent on congressional appropriations
to exercise these powers, presidents also should not be bound by
appropriations restrictions on how those powers are exercised.
Accordingly, direct conditions on resource-independent powers are per
se invalid. Congress may not prevent particular exercises of these
powers by denying appropriations for them; nor may it condition funds
for the White House or executive agencies on the president exercising
or not exercising these powers in a particular way. Indeed, in at least
some cases, giving effect to such appropriations provisions would
profoundly distort the constitutional structure. On some level, for
example, the veto and pardon powers are executive checks on
legislative authority. It would make no sense if Congress could control
those powers’ exercise through appropriations legislation.
The question becomes more complicated with respect to what I call
“indirect conditions.” What if Congress does not directly restrict the
exercise of resource-independent powers, but instead attempts to
manipulate their exercise through selective provision of staff support
and other resources? A version of this problem arose during the
Obama Administration when Congress denied funds for a White House
“Climate Change Czar.” Although President Obama objected to this
provision on constitutional grounds, he appears to have complied with
it in practice. A more routine version of this problem arises when
3. Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 87, 89 (1976).
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Congress attempts to prevent or require drafting of legislation by
executive agencies. The executive branch views such legislation, too,
as unconstitutional because it limits presidential authority to
recommend to Congress “such Measures as [the president] shall judge
necessary and expedient.”4
Contrary to some executive branch assertions, such indirect
restraints on resource-independent powers are unconstitutional only in
narrow circumstances. As a general matter, Congress holds broad
authority to structure the executive branch and direct greater resources
to some functions than others. Nevertheless, by analogy to certain
“unconstitutional conditions” case law, including the Supreme Court’s
decision in NFIB v. Sebelius that the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid
expansion was unconstitutionally coercive,5 the article argues that some
constraints on executive branch funding and personnel may unduly
manipulate executive judgments that properly belong to the president
alone.
Specifically, the article argues that Congress may not provide close
advisers to the president while preventing use of such advisers for
particular narrow purposes, such as granting particular categories of
pardons or coordinating administrative actions with respect to some
particular narrow policy goal, such as mitigating climate change or
improving energy-independence. By this standard, the Climate Change
Czar provision approached the constitutional line but did not cross it,
given that the president could readily pursue the same policy goals
using other, more general-purpose White House personnel. With
respect to other executive personnel, an appropriations restriction could
likewise violate the Constitution if it prevented the president from
employing the most natural officer for a particular purpose. The
executive branch has thus been correct to disregard legislation that, for
instance, prevents the EPA from assisting in drafting new
environmental legislation, but it does not follow that the president may
employ whomever he chooses within the executive branch to assist
with constitutional tasks such as recommending legislation or vetting
particular pardons.

4. See Application of the Recommendations Clause to Section 802 of the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 40
Op. O.L.C. (Aug. 25, 2016).
5. 567 U.S. 519, 577–78 (2012).
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Resource-Dependent Powers
Other executive authorities have a completely different character.
In particular, law enforcement and warfare are powers presidents
cannot hope to exercise on their own. They are instead thoroughly
dependent on resources—resources that the Appropriations Clause
makes clear only Congress can provide. Even assuming doing so
would be lawful, a president might ride out on her own, pistol or
handcuffs in hand, but without support from armies or investigators,
she would not accomplish much in terms of protecting the nation or
redressing crime. In fact, the relevant constitutional provisions
expressly recognize this resource-dependence. The Take Care Clause
assigns responsibility for enforcing federal law to the president, but the
Clause’s indirect formulation—obligating the president to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,” not to execute them directly—
contemplates that the president will be dependent on other officers to
carry out this function. Likewise, the Commander in Chief Clause
grants presidents power only insofar as Congress has given them
something to command.
Given the president’s thorough-going dependence on
appropriations to exercise these powers, it follows that Congress may
impose whatever conditions it likes in appropriations legislation.
Congress may, for example, as it routinely does, deny appropriations to
enforce particular regulations or administrative understandings. By the
same token, it may prevent enforcement of disfavored statutes, as it has
done in recent years by barring use of Justice Department funds to
prosecute state-authorized medical-marijuana distributors. President
Trump’s signing statement suggesting otherwise was thus mistaken.
Admittedly, like Trump, some historical presidents, including
Rutherford Hayes and Ronald Reagan, have asserted instead that their
responsibility to ensure faithful execution of the laws is independent of
any congressional authority over resources. But in practice they have
never meaningfully acted on this view. Historical practice thus
powerfully confirms the structural inference that law enforcement
authority is resource dependent and, as such, subject to plenary
congressional control.
Much the same pattern applies to use of military force. Although
presidents have sometimes asserted preclusive authority over troop
dispositions and use of military force, they appear to have generally
complied with express limitations on their deployment or use of the
Armed Forces. In keeping with that practice, historic limitations on use
of force in Southeast Asia at the close of the Vietnam War were
generally valid. Likewise, legislation being considered in Congress
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that would mandate continued deployments in Syria or South Korea
would be binding on the executive branch.
The Hard Case of Diplomacy
A last hard question relates to presidential authority over foreign
affairs. To be sure, some aspects of presidential foreign affairs
authority may be easily classified. To the extent it is valid as a matter
of first principles, the presidential authority to recognize foreign states,
governments, and territory6 is resource independent and thus subject to
the same analysis outlined above for the pardon and veto powers. In
contrast, affirmative provision of foreign aid is clearly resourcedependent, some historic presidential assertions to the contrary
notwithstanding.
The power that defies easy analysis is diplomacy, in the sense of
actual diplomatic communication. As a matter of first principles, this
power might properly be considered resource dependent: A president’s
power to communicate with foreign officials might be dependent on
Congress’s choice to provide ambassadors and other diplomatic
resources.
Longstanding practice, however, supports exclusive
presidential authority over official diplomatic communications with
foreign states. In keeping with that view, presidents have in fact defied
appropriations limitations on diplomatic activity with some regularity.
Even granting this practice and the basic theory of presidential
authority that underlies it, however, limiting principles applicable to
indirect conditions on other resource-independent presidential powers
should apply equally in this context. Accordingly, Congress may not
preclude any use of the State Department or other government
resources to make certain communications; nor may it prevent
presidents from using the most natural official, such as the U.S.
ambassador to a particular foreign state, from relaying the President’s
preferred view. It may, however, structure the overall diplomatic
apparatus at a higher level of generality, providing more resources to
some embassies and divisions than others, even if doing so has some
effect on the ultimate diplomatic positions the president chooses to
take.

6.

See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2087 (2015).

46

Scholarship for the Bench

[Vol. 3

Conclusion
Fitting constitutional executive authorities together with
Congress’s power over appropriations presents a structural puzzle that
has received insufficient scholarly attention. Distinguishing between
resource-independent and resource-dependent executive powers
provides the proper means of resolving increasingly common
interbranch conflicts over this question. Some executive powers are
resource-independent and thus largely immune to congressional control
through restricted or conditional appropriations. Others, most notably
law enforcement and warfare, are resource-dependent and thus subject
to near-plenary congressional control. Recognizing this distinction and
its proper implications provides a coherent and satisfactory means of
resolving recurrent disputes over relative congressional and executive
constitutional authority with respect to government finance.
Current political polarization and animosity appears to give
presidents powerful incentives to defy appropriations restrictions that
thwart policy goals favored by their constituents. But we can ill-afford
further erosion of this important constraint on executive governance.
Recognizing the proper contours and limits of executive authority to
defy appropriations restrictions may help sustain a meaningful system
of checks and balances in the years ahead.

